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Introduction 
The legal status of the embryo is a surprisingly unsettled 
question in German law. Traditionally, family law deals 
with parents and children, it regulates custodial powers of 
the parents and the protection of children. Since an embryo 
is not yet a child, it is not per se included in statutory 
provisions which speak of 'children' or 'minors'. 
Increasing knowledge of the development of human 
life and modern techniques of artificial insemination in 
vitro and in vivo have led to a growing awareness of the 
human dignity to be attributed to an embryo. This aware­
ness has caused embittered discussions on the abortion 
issue. While the lawfulness of abortion is primarily a 
question of criminal law,1 the discussion has recently 
expanded into the family law field. I f an embryo constitutes 
human life, an analogous application of the provisions on 
custody and child protection seems an automatic conse­
quence. The issue is essentially one of protection: should 
the embryo in the mother's womb be afforded the same, or 
at least a similar protection as a child? In legal terms: can 
you ward a foetus,2 and should we ward a foetus? This 
question leads to two different sets of problems. First, is the 
embryo protected from abortion not only by the criminal 
law, but also and independently by family law? Secondly, 
may the state as parens patriae protect the embryo from 
any other conduct by the pregnant woman, such as sub­
stance abuse, drinking alcoholic beverages, and compar­
able dangers? 
Though this article will focus on the as yet rather 
undeveloped German legal discussion of these problems, 
it will also include some comparative materials with regard 
to English and US law. This article wil l not discuss dangers 
for the human embryo from scientific progress in the field 
of medically assisted procreation, in particular 'leftover' 
embryos and prenatal medical treatment or genetic altera­
tion of the embryo. 
In the field of private law, child protection 'post 
factum' is relatively well established. Provided the child is 
born alive, he or she is entitled to claim damages for injuries 
inflicted before birth or even before conception.3 It is 
disputed, however, whether the parents themselves are 
liable for damages too, i f they have caused injuries to the 
embryo, although it appears damages may be claimed i f the 
parents, or one of them, suffered a venereal disease, which 
has been transferred to the embryo.4 In other claims there 
is a tendency to distinguish between the father and mother: 
the father who negligently or intentionally has injured the 
embryo is treated like any other third party, while the 
mother, according to some legal authors, should not be held 
liable because of her right to personal freedom and pri­
vacy.5 I f the child has not been prenatally injured by human 
acts but has been born with pre-existing defects, or has been 
born healthy but unwanted by his or her parents, the German 
courts have had to decide the same issues as courts in other 
countries, known as 'wrongful birth' and 'wrongful life' 
actions. The results of such cases have been essentially the 
same as those in the USA or in the UK: while parents can 
recover damages for the birth of the child (more precisely, 
for their unwanted support obligations towards the child), 
the childs claim for 'wrongful life' has been rejected.6 
Child protection law and abortion 
Current discussion in Germany, England and 
the USA 
In a recent highly publicised case in Germany, a husband had 
learnt of the intention of his pregnant wife to abort the 
embryo applied for an injunction against his wife as her 
husband and on behalf of the unborn child. The right to act 
for the embryo against the mother was conferred upon him 
by a previous decision of the wardship court.7 The civil court 
did not issue an injunction because the doctor, on being 
informed by the court of the pending proceeding, felt unable 
to proceed with the abortion and the wife was persuaded to 
give birth to the child. Had she decided otherwise, the civil 
court apparently was willing to intervene in favour of the 
embryo, even though the wife had obtained the medical 
certificate necessary for a legal abortion.8 
Wardship courts have claimed jurisdiction in relation 
to abortions in other contexts too. When asked by minor girls 
to dispense with the necessary parental consent for an 
abortion, the courts not only weigh the merits of the parents' 
and the daughter's conflicting views, but go a step further 
and second-guess the medical evaluation which certifies the 
legality of the intended abortion.9 
This attitude of the civil courts and wardship courts has 
opened a second front in the war on abortion. The lines 
between lawful and illegal abortions, as drawn by criminal 
law, seem to be inconclusive since they may be re-evaluated 
according to the rules and principles designed to govern the 
parent-child relationship in family law. 
These problems are not unknown to the Anglo-Ameri­
can world. In England, the High Court had to consider a 
husband's application for an injunction in a case which 
presented a very similar factual situation to the German case 
mentioned above.10 After having found that the provision of 
the Abortion Act 1967 had been correctly complied with by 
the doctors and the wife, Sir George Baker Ρ in Paton ν 
Trustees of BP AS11 dismissed the claim for an injunction. In 
his view, the foetus had no right of its own before birth and 
a separate existence from its mother. Neither has the hus­
band a right to stop his wife or the doctors from performing 
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the abortion. Unless 'there is clear bad faith and an obvious 
attempt to perpetrate a criminal offence', the judges should 
not interfere with the discretion of the doctors acting under 
the Abortion Act 1967.12 Even in such a case, the matter 
should be left to criminal law proceedings rather than to the 
civil courts.13 
There has been much discussion of these cases. The 
correctness of the statement by Sir George Baker Ρ that a 
foetus 'cannot have a right of its own' has been questioned; 
some ascertain 'anomalies and inconsistencies in the exist­
ing legal principles relating to the unborn child' 1 4 or 'a 
complicated patchwork of "rights'" of the foetus.15 The 
judges did not, it is argued, fully discuss the appropriateness 
of wardship proceedings to protect a foetus.16 The conse­
quences of this position, however, are unclear: Phillips 
argues in favour of foetus protection by the wardship court, 
Lowe denies such protection for policy reasons.17 Others 
see some interrelationship between the Abortion Act and 
child protection law. The unfettered application of the latter 
should not undermine the policies of the Abortion Act and 
generally be utilised as an anti-abortion procedure.18 But, 
on the other hand, the Abortion Act 1967 was deemed 
unsatisfactory with regard to the interests of the foetus - the 
decision to abort is left to the mother and two doctors, and 
no one ensures that adequate consideration is given to the 
developmental stage and interests of the foetus.19 
The legal background in the USA is somewhat differ­
ent from that in England or Germany, because the decision 
to terminate pregnancy within the first trimester is left to the 
free decision of the woman. The attempt of the Missouri 
legislator to require the written consent of the husband 
before an abortion may be performed has been held uncon­
stitutional by the US Supreme Court.20 Neither the further­
ance of marriage nor the interests of the husband were held 
sufficient reasons to justify an intrusion into the freedom of 
the wife. State legislation may not even require the doctor21 
or the wife 2 2 to notify the husband of the planned abortion. 
It seems obvious that, under these circumstances, any 
application of the husband for an injunction against his wife 
or her physician must fail. Nevertheless, there have been a 
number of applications in recent years which have been 
successful in the trial courts.23 The injunctions are lifted 
regularly by the Appellate Courts,24 but the applicant may 
have gained valuable time. The idea of independent inter­
ests and rights of the unborn child was not considered in Roe 
ν Wade.25 It has attracted more attention recently in the 
context of' regulating the pregnancy' , 2 6 There are no known 
cases where child protection law has been considered as an 
instrument for the prevention of abortion.27 
Apparently, the interrelationship of abortion law and 
family law, especially child protection law, seems to be a 
relatively new and unexplored issue in many countries. In 
the following discussion a closer look will be taken at the 
legal framework and principles under German law. 
Embryo protection by German family law: 
basic questions 
The first question to be answered is whether the embryo is 
a 'person' within the meaning of the law and, as such, 
endowed with human rights, or only a dependent part of the 
body of the pregnant woman. The answer does not follow 
from natural sciences nor from logic, it depends on a value 
judgment. The German Civil Code attributes legal per­
sonality to a human being from birth onwards, not before,28 
but that does not necessarily mean that the embryo is 
considered as legally non-existent. The Civil Code itself, 
especially in the context of tort and inheritance law, takes 
notice of the embryo.29 As to fundamental human rights, the 
German Constitutional Court has found that the embryo has 
to be considered not only as potential, but as an already 
existing 'human life' and as such entitled at least to basic 
rights under the German constitution, and to protection of 
such rights.30 One of these rights is the 'right to life' as 
guaranteed by Article 2 I I 1 of the German constitution.31 
Secondly, in order to fall within the scope of family 
law, the protection owed to the embryo has to be defined as 
part of the parental custodial duties. The allocation of rights 
and responsibilities with regard to the care of children is laid 
down in Article 6 I I of the German constitution: primary 
caretakers are the child's parents, while the state is confined 
to the role of watchdog (parens patriae). Wardship and 
custody proceedings in Germany are understood and de­
fined by statute as interventions of the state as parens 
patriae whenever the protective function of the parents is 
considered ineffective. This distribution of competence 
and the line of demarcation between parents and state 
should apply to the unborn child as well. The legislator of 
the German Civil Code has already foreseen the need for 
prenatal care and protection of the future rights of the child 
and, analogously to the rules on custody, this care is 
allocated primarily to the parents.32 The statute speaks of 
'future rights' because in 1900 the notion of foetal rights 
had not been developed. Since the recognition of such rights 
by the constitution of 1949, as interpreted by the German 
Constitutional Court, it is submitted that section 1912 BGB 
(German Civil Code) should be read so as to include 
'existing rights' of the embryo as well. According to firmly 
established principles of interpretation, the ascertainable 
intent of the legislator has to be given priority over the literal 
meaning of the statutory language. By enacting section 
1912 BGB, it was the obvious intent of the legislator to 
subordinate the embryo, as far as it could conceivably be a 
subject of law, to the same custodial system which applies 
to children. The consequences for the correct interpretation 
of section 1912 BGB are seldom addressed directly,33 but 
even without reference to this statutory provision there is 
agreement that the protection of the newly established 
foetal rights and interests should rest primarily with the 
parents-to-be.34 
It would appear that the parents are also invested with 
primary responsibility for the well-being of the embryo. It 
has been argued that the right to kil l a child is not included 
within the custodial powers of parents. Instead, the respon­
sibilities of the parents includes the protection of the child 
from being injured or killed, and a parent who failed to 
provide this protection 'neglects' the child, giving rise to 
state intervention to protect the child. 
How is this intervention to be realised? There are two 
civil proceedings35 available to invoke the protective func­
tion of the state as parens patriae. In the first place, 
jurisdiction for child protection is vested in the wardship 
courts. Under section 1666 BGB (German Civil Code) they 
may intervene on behalf of an endangered child upon 
Journal of Child Law, Vol. 5, No. 2,1993 89 
application of a parent, of third parties, or ex officio.36 They 
can order whichever preventive measures are deemed 
necessary and appropriate against the parents or third 
parties. Thus a husband who wants to prevent the killing of 
his child (or his child-to-be) by its mother can call for the 
help of the wardship court.37 The second procedural way 
leads to the general civil courts. When the well-being of 
their child is endangered by somebody else, the parents, 
instead of addressing themselves to the wardship court, may 
choose to apply for an injunction against that third party by 
the civil court. They may base this application on their legal 
rights as parents or alternatively on the rights of their child, 
as representatives of their child.3 8 The civil courts, how-
ever, have no jurisdiction to enjoin a parent from endanger-
ing or even killing his child. On the level of private law, such 
jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the wardship courts.39 
Thus, the application of the husband against his pregnant 
wife, as mentioned above, was ill-founded. 
The influence of abortion law on child 
protection law 
All court interventions based on private law, be it civil 
courts or wardship courts, which purport to prevent the 
abortion of an embryo, have to take into account the line 
which the legislator has drawn in criminal law between 
lawful and illegal abortions. Present abortion law in Ger-
many does not freely admit abortions within certain time 
limits, but states specific justifications and requirements 
which have to be positively met in order to make an abortion 
lawful.4 0 Do these rules of criminal law preclude any 
intervention by courts of another branch of law which are 
inconsistent with penal abortion law? For the purposes of 
our subject, we should distinguish three alternatives. 
First, where the abortion would not be justified under 
criminal law, there is no reason to curtail the jurisdiction of 
wardship courts to protect the life of the embryo by preven-
tive measures. Section 1666 of the German Civil Code 
confers upon the court not only the right, but also the duty 
to intervene, whenever the court learns of a planned illegal 
abortion.41 
Secondly, even i f the requirements of criminal law are 
met in an actual case, some authors argue that this should not 
hinder the courts in acting for the protection of the embryo 
on the basis of family law provisions regarding parental 
neglect. An abortion, it is argued, can never be 'justified' in 
law. The statutory provisions of criminal law simply waive 
the state's claim to punish illegal acts under certain condi-
tions.42 According to the prevailing view, however, abor-
tions justified under criminal law are 'lawful acts',43 and 
what is lawful in one branch of law cannot be considered 
unlawful or 'parental neglect' in another legal context.44 
This position seems to be correct. The balancing 
between the conflicting rights and interests of the pregnant 
woman and the embryo established by the German legisla-
tor and the Constitutional Court must be conclusive for all 
branches of law, the result has to be accepted and cannot be 
altered by the application of family law. The legal relation 
betwe'en parents and children is not dominated by parental 
rights, but by the parental duty to promote the welfare of the 
child. The law on children is governed by the 'best interest' 
principle and leaves no room for the weighing of equiva-
lent, but conflicting interests of individuals. In the extreme 
case where only the life of the foetus or the life of the mother 
could be saved, wardship courts would be bound to decide 
in favour of the foetus without looking at the interests of the 
mother.45 For this reason, too, family law is ill-equipped to 
procure justice for both embryo and mother. 
Thirdly, the legal situation in a given case remains 
doubtful, even though the woman has obtained a doctor's 
certificate attesting that the statutory requirements for a 
legal abortion are met. May the wardship court take up the 
issue independently, investigate the correctness of the 
doctor's statement and, i f it believes that an abortion would 
not be justified, order preventive measures for the protec-
tion of the embryo? 
Again there is disagreement in the legal discussion. 
Some argue that the medical judgment in relation to abor-
tion is meant to be decisive and the requirements cannot be 
re-examined by the civil courts.46 The possibility of chal-
lenging the doctor's medical judgment might lead to unnec-
essary harrassment of women seeking an abortion. At least 
two courts, however, have claimed the authority to re-
examine the doctor's decision. In the first case,47 a pregnant 
girl of 16 years wanted to abort the embryo while her 
parents were opposed to the operation. Since the minor 
could not get the abortion without the consent of her parents, 
she applied to the wardship court for parental consent to be 
dispensed with. She argued that her parents, in withholding 
their consent, abused their custodial rights. The court not 
only refused to interfere with the parental decision, but, 
despite the fact that the girl had presented two medical 
certificates stating the existence of legal grounds for an 
abortion, issued an injunction restraining the girl from 
obtaining an abortion. The second case presented a reverse 
situation.48 The parents urged their 16 year-old daughter to 
have an abortion, but she wanted to carry the child to term. 
The parents procured a doctor's certificate which stated 
legal grounds for the abortion. The court, informed by the 
welfare department, made the girl a ward of court and 
deprived the parents of their custodial rights with regard to 
the abortion issue. It not only found that the attitude of the 
parents constituted child abuse, but questioned the correct-
ness of the doctors certificate and consequently the legality 
of the planned abortion. According to this view, the foetal 
right to life does not cease just because a doctor has issued 
a certificate, but only i f in fact a situation of distress, as 
defined by the statute, exists and as such is properly stated 
by a doctor. I f the certificate is wrong, the rights of the 
embryo prevail and the wardship courts are justified in 
protecting its life. 4 9 The investigation by the courts is said 
to include considering whether the pregnant woman's 
existing distress could be averted by means other than an 
abortion, possibly by adoption of the child 5 0 or by the 
father's announced willingness to assume the care of the 
future child.5 1 
A third proposal tries to find a compromise between 
these two extremes. Accordingly, as a matter of principle, 
a wardship court's competence to re-evaluate the prerequi-
sites for a lawful abortion should not be denied, but the court 
should allow substantial margin to the doctor's discretion 
and should intervene only in cases involving obvious abuse.52 
The Federal Supreme Court of Germany has already ap-
plied limited judicial review of medical abortion certifi-
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cates in other contexts,53 a similar attitude seems appropri-
ate with regard to child (or embryo, respectively) protection 
proceedings.54 This would discourage inconsiderate and 
frivolous attacks on medical certificates, but, on the other 
hand, allow protection of the embryo in cases where the 
foetal right to life obviously has been disregarded by the 
woman and her doctor. 
One may conclude that in Germany the child protec-
tion provisions of family law have a supporting and comple-
mentary function in abortion cases. The wardship courts in 
applying family law, however, do not have the power to 
override the balance of interests struck by the penal code, 
and they should not second-guess the doctor's certificate on 
the lawfulness of the abortion, unless the certificate is 
clearly false. 
Managing the pregnancy: the protection 
of the embryo from being injured by 
maternal conduct 
Abortion means the intentional destruction of the embryo. 
A different set of problems arises where the woman is 
willing to carry the foetus to term, but by her personal 
conduct endangers the health or even the life of the embryo. 
Three types of behaviour may become relevant here. 
First, a woman's conduct may be dangerous or detri-
mental for herself, and these self-inflicted dangers extend 
to the embryo in the mother's womb (possibly in an aggra-
vated form): such conduct as drug, alcohol or nicotine 
abuse, and also careless sexual or other social contacts with 
the imminent danger of infections (e.g. AIDS, venereal 
diseases). 
Second, the woman may engage in activities quite 
normal and acceptable for an adult but involving some risks 
for the foetus (e.g. motorbike riding, climbing on ladders, 
air travel, taking holidays in countries with undeveloped 
health-care systems or with an unhealthy climate). In fact, 
there is virtually no behaviour which has no conceivable 
impact on the well-being of the embryo. 
In a third group, are those women who refuse what is 
seen as necessary medical treatment either for themselves 
or their embryo. 
The consequences of maternal conduct and decisions 
during pregnancy for the embryo and the child after birth 
can be severe or even disastrous. Scientific evidence shows 
that the abuse of alcohol during pregnancy, for example, 
may cause alcoholembryopathy to the child, who at the time 
of birth is already damaged for life. 5 5 The refusal of a blood 
transfusion or a caesarean section may lead to the still-birth 
of the child. While these issues call for protection of the 
embryo and the regulation of maternal conduct, it would not 
reflect sound legal policy to subject women, from concep-
tion onwards, to strict state supervision and, thereby, reduce 
them to procreation machines or, as has been said in the 
USA to 'fetal containers' stripped of any personal rights.56 
Current discussion and positions in Germany, 
the USA and England 
In Germany, the problem has not yet attracted full judicial 
and scholarly attention. While third persons are held civilly 
and criminally liable for damages to the child before its 
birth,5 7 the liability of the mother herself is strongly dis-
puted. The arguments in tort law and criminal law are 
essentially the same. While some authors hold the position 
that the state should not interfere even indirectly with the 
personal freedom of the pregnant woman, and that no legal 
duties of care exist towards the unborn life, 5 8 others see no 
reason to exempt the mother from liability - her privacy 
interests deserve less protection than those of the child in 
being born without serious health defects. The preventive 
protection of the embryo by the wardship courts, has not yet 
been a subject of dicussion. This may change in the future, 
because very often legal developments in the USA tend to 
spill over to Europe. In the USA, the protection of the 
embryo by means of civil law has become a major issue of 
legal controversy. Several courts have intervened on behalf 
of the foetus and have ordered medical or surgical treatment 
against the will of the pregnant woman,59 or have seized 
custody of the foetus (in fact of the woman) in order to 
prevent harmful conduct,60 or have allowed the child to sue 
his mother for prenatal injuries inflicted on him. 6 1 Others, 
especially the Illinois Supreme Court in a well-reasoned 
decision, have rejected such practices: 
'Judicial scrutiny into the day-to-day lifes of pregnant 
women would involve an inprecedented intrusion into the 
privacy and autonomy of the citizens of this state . . . the 
decision must come from the legislature only after thorough 
investigation, study and debate.'62 
The English courts have been much more cautious on 
this issue. The antenatal behaviour of a mother was consid-
ered in care proceedings in the Berkshire case,63 but in that 
case protection of the foetus was not at stake, the child was 
already born. In Re F, however, the local authority tried to 
initiate wardship proceedings in relation to an unborn child, 
as the mother, a drug addict and suffering from a severe 
mental disturbance, had moved to an unknown place.64 The 
application was unsuccessful. The judges of the Court of 
Appeal did not question the foetus' need for protection but 
they felt unable to extend the wardship jurisdiction to 
unborn children. The foetus was said to have no legal right 
of its own,6 5 and the effect of wardship would be an 
intolerable and unenforceable control of the mother's life. 6 6 
The judges agreed that such powers should be conferred 
upon the courts only by an Act of Parliament, which would 
also have to provide the necessary limits and safeguards.67 
Thus, the English courts refuse to protect the foetus 
qua foetus from being injured by the unreasonable conduct 
of its mother. The line of reasoning in the legal literature 
is similar to the American discussion: some focus on the 
human rights of the unborn child and would extend protec-
tion to the embryo,68 others look at the personal freedom 
of the mother and insist that wardship jurisdiction does not 
empower the courts to control the life of persons other than 
the ward.69 In the final analysis there are but few chances 
to reconcile the interests of foetus and mother. The impo-
sition of civil or criminal liabilities on the mother are 
deemed unsuitable. In the case of an irreconcilable con-
flict, the interests of the foetus have to give way, because 
its legal personality is not yet fully developed and it is still 
part of the mother. But, according to Fortin, 7 0 the wardship 
jurisdiction should be exercised more flexibly than in 
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Re F, and extended to the foetus, especially in cases where 
this would further both the interests of the foetus and the 
mother. 
The proper approach under German law 
Constitutional law 
Most of the views expressed proceed from the same premise: 
the acceptance of the embryo as a human being separate 
from its mother and the recognition of independent foetal 
rights require the automatic legal protection of these rights, 
as i f the embryo were a person separate from the mother. 
The conclusion depends on a personal value judgment. The 
opposite view, which tries to avoid this conclusion for 
policy reasons, feels compelled to deny foetal rights against 
the mother altogether. 
The premise of both sides is erroneous, as it inevit-
ably leads to an all-or-nothing approach with regard to 
foetal protection, which fails to procure justice for the 
mother or the embryo. The recognition of the legal rights 
of the embryo is the necessary precondition for its protec-
tion, 7 1 but as such does no more than open the door to a 
balancing process of the legal rights and interests of the 
embryo and those of the mother, respectively. 
This two-step approach has been followed by the 
German Constitutional Court in the abortion context, but 
is appropriate in other contexts too. After having estab-
lished the independent constitutional rights of the embryo 
and having confirmed the individual rights of pregnant 
women, the court continues: 
'This right (of the woman) is not granted unconditionally, 
however - it is limited by the personal rights of others and 
the principles of law and morals. The intrusion into consti-
tutionally protected rights of others can never be justified 
without legal approval nor can such rights be destroyed 
together with the life of the other, especially where nature 
itself has attributed a special responsibility for such life (to 
the mother).'72 
Article 2 I 1 of the German constitution which, 
according to the court, applies to embryos as well, guaran-
tees not only the right to life, but also to bodily integrity. 
Thus, it is submitted, the personal rights of the woman 
have to be weighed not only against the foetal right to life 
in the abortion context, but also against the foetal right to 
be free from bodily harm. This task has still to be fulfilled 
by German courts. 
The outcome of the balancing process cannot be 
found on a general and abstract level; it depends on the 
(potential) injuries to the embryo and the degree of intru-
sion into the rights and integrity of the mother. But, 
according to the principles of interpretation developed by 
the German Constitutional Court, no constitutionally pro-
tected right may override another conflicting right. In 
other words, the question is not 'foetal rights or womens 
rights', it is rather 'how can both constitutional positions 
be harmonised in a way which leaves each of them as 
untouched as possible?'. No easy answer can be expected 
to this question because the problems presented are far 
more complex and varied than the abortion issue. 
The family law approach 
What are the consequences for a reasonable application of 
the child protection provisions of family law? As we have 
seen in the context of abortion, the balance of interests 
found by the legislator in criminal law has proved to be 
conclusive for family law too. With regard to the negligent 
or otherwise dangerous conduct of pregnant women, there 
is no such body of statutory guidance. Thus, one could 
conclude that the civil courts have free rein to protect the 
embryo to the same extent as they protect born children. But 
this conclusion would be premature for two reasons. 
First, the law on parents and children is, as already 
indicated, ill-equipped to contribute to the balancing of 
interests between mother and embryo, as required by the 
constitution. This branch of law is dominated by the childs 
interest and does not acknowledge any parental right to the 
detriment of the child.7 3 Unrestricted application of child 
protection provisions is, however, likely to violate consti-
tutional rights of the pregnant woman. 
Secondly, all state intrusions into private rights have 
to conform to a fundamental principle of German law: the 
'principle of proportionality',74 which means that any state 
intervention is lawful only i f it can be shown to be neces-
sary, as well as effective, and i f the damage caused by the 
intervention is not disproportionate in relation to the ex-
pected advantages. This principle has been stressed by the 
German legislator, especially with regard to child protec-
tion proceedings.75 Though preventive measures ordered 
by civil courts may be necessary for the protection of the 
embryo, it seems doubtful i f they would be effective and 
proportionate. In the case of a drug-addicted or alcohol-
abusing woman, what could a court do to control and 
enforce its order that the woman should, in future, refrain 
from this abuse? Effective prevention would require per-
manent public supervision of the woman, day and night, 
which obviously is impossible, and i f it were possible, it 
probably would be disproportionate, as would be the con-
finement of the woman until the day of birth.76The situation 
would be different, for example, where the woman refuses 
a caesarean section though the doctors strongly recommend 
it, because of an imminent danger to the embryo. The court 
order could dispense with the requirement of consent and 
thus make the caesarean section possible. But the jurisdic-
tion of the court to decide this issue merely on the basis of 
the child protection provision has to be questioned. The 
woman has made her decision with regard to her own body, 
and her constitutional rights to do so have to be taken into 
account properly. 
As a result, my proposition is that the preventive 
powers of a wardship court under the authority of child 
protection provisions should be confined to mandatory 
instruction, admonition and directive orders, but should not 
include instruments of enforcement.77 I f the woman decides 
not to follow the directive of the court, she will open herself 
to the sanctions of criminal law as well as possible tort 
actions i f the child is later born damaged as a result of her 
conduct.78 
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NOTES 
1. For England see the Abortion Act 1967. The somewhat half-hearted 
approach of German criminal law (ss 218219d StGB, German Penal 
Code) has proved unsatisfactory for both sides, opponents and support-
ers of abortion, and has provoked some very unpleasant and highly 
disputed criminal proceedings against doctors and their female clients. 
Because the Contract on the Unification of Germany (Einigungsvertrag) 
has left untouched for a limited period of time the more liberal statute of 
the former German Democratic Republic for the Eastern part of Ger-
many, there has to be law reform in the next few years on the abortion 
issue. The German legislator enacted a new Abortion Law on 27 July 
1992, but the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht BVerfG) 
by an injunction of 4 August 1992 has stopped the statute from coming 
into force immediately {Neue Juristische Wochenschrift NJW 1992, 
2343). The Court will decide on the constitutionality of the new statute 
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